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Abstract: The article outlines the variety of trickery vocabulary in Epitome de Tito Livio, written 
by Lucius Annaeus Florus in the 2nd century A.D. Among the Latin nouns that are equivalents of 
Greek trickery terms, it is necessary to mention especially dolus, fraus, consilium, ars, furtum and 
sollertia. Their use demonstrates Florus’ skillfulness and ability to show the arcana of ancient his‑
tory, tradition and culture in an interesting way. In his texts, based on dichotomies – e.g. between 
virtus and fortuna as well as between just and unjust wars – there are numerous passages in which it 
is possible to find examples of trickery vocabulary. He established that both the Romans and aliens 
were ready to make ultimate sacrifices in order to defeat their enemies. They used weather condi‑
tions, surprise, military position and their own ingeniousness to achieve victory. 
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[…] regnum dolo partum sic egit (sc. Servius Tullius)
 industrie, ut iure adeptus videretur2.
1 This article was written thanks to a grant funded by the Lanckoroński Foundation. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude for financial support and the opportunity for 
a one-month stay at research centres in London and Oxford (March 2017).
The main aim of this article is to expand an issue, which was briefly addressed in my doctoral 
dissertation “Florus’ vision of Rome”, defended on 10th October 2016.
2 Flor. 1, 1, 2: “[…] filled (sc. Servius Tullius) the position, thus obtained by craft, with so much 
diligence that he seemed to have acquired it by right” [Florus: Epitome of Roman history. Transl. 
E.S. Fos te r. London 1929]. 
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Ancient languages provide us with a great variety of vocabulary connected with ancient military tactics and trickery. Among the equivalents of Greek 
terms such as sophia, techne, mechane, dolos, apate and phronesis, it is possible 
to list Latin consilium (plan), dolus (trick), fraus (deceit) and insidiae (trick, am‑
bush). However, it is necessary to stress that only a few of them have a Greek ety‑
mology while the majority are simply Latin terms denoting trickery or cunning3. 
All of them were frequently used in both ancient poetry and prose. As far as the 
latter is concerned it is impossible to discount a large number of historiographical 
texts, including the Epitome de Tito Livio, written by Lucius Annaeus Florus in the 
2nd century A.D.
An analysis of Florus’ text gives the reader an opportunity to discern the prin‑
cipal elements on which it is constructed: the periodization of history analogous to 
stages of human growth and the differentiation between virtus and fortuna – which 
are the reflection of human values and the divine element respectively – as well as 
the dichotomy of just and unjust wars. Just wars – waged in defence of boundaries 
or allies or for acquiring new territories – led to the creation of a strong, powerful 
Roman Empire, while unjust wars – fratricidal and domestic wars – weakened it 
and contributed to its fall. This division of wars lies at the core of Florus’ history, 
in which we can find numerous passages describing military tactics and strate‑
gies. Both Romans and aliens tried different ways to tip the balance of the conflict 
towards their own victory. They were more or less effective but always aimed at 
defending the enemies. 
For the Romans dolus was the opposite of good faith. In a narrow sense it 
directly designates fraud. In a wider context it refers to all actions or social beha‑ 
viour, which contravene proper moral values4. At first glance the problem of deceit 
during military actions was established early in pre‑Republican history as one of 
many martial qualities. Thanks to its utility and aims Roman duplicity could have 
been regarded as positive and effective. Romulus was the first to use ambush (in-
sidiae) and simulated fight (fugae quoque, quae simulanda erat) during the con‑
quest of the Fidenae5. Such tactics were later used eagerly by the Romans over the 
course of their history6. In an analysis of the Epitome de Tito Livio it is important 
to stress that Florus tried to remain objective in his judgements. His opinions were 
characterized by pragmatism, which was a strong foundation for appreciation of 
the author among the ancient writers. His idea of outlining the true history is vis‑
ible in the descriptions of wars – in which he presented the Romans in unfavour‑
3 E.L. W heele r: Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery. Leiden 1988, p. 50.
4 H. Coi ng: Analysis of moral values by case-law. In: Law, culture and values: Essays in 
honor of Gray L. Dorsey. Ed. S.A. Vojcan i n. London 1990, p. 105. 
5 Liv. 1. 14. 7–8. 
6 P. Lee ‑Stecu m: Mendacia maiorum: Tales of deceit in pre-republican Rome. In: Private and 
public lies. The discourse of despotism and deceit in the Graeco-Roman world. Ed. A.J. Tu r ner,
J.H.K. On Chong‑ Gossa rd, F.J. Ver vae t. Leiden 2010, pp. 250–251.
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able ways with reference to the decline of Roman morality and critical assessments 
of both internal and external conflicts7. The passages in which he described both 
Roman and alien trickery display his consciousness and honesty in creating a ju‑
dicious history, which identified both fair and unfair protagonists. Describing the 
history of Rome Florus willingly used terms such as consilium8, sollertia9, ars10, 
dolus, fraus, furtum11 and calliditas12. Some of them directly relate to deceits and 
trickery practised in order to win a battle or rise to power. The first example is the 
noun dolus, which is related to the Greek equivalent dolos13. In the first chapter 
of Epitome Florus described the heroism of Horatius, who defeated the Albani by 
faking his own escape:
Tribus quippe illinc volneratis, hinc duobus occisis, qui supererat Horatius 
addito ad virtutem dolo, ut distraheret hostem, simulat fugam singulosque, 
prout sequi poterant, adortus exsuperat14. 
After his brothers’ death Horatius provoked his enemies into a pursuit during 
which they were killed. His action was not only brave but also effective and very 
smart. In the quoted passage there is a phrase particularly worth noting, namely 
addito ad virtutem dolo. As an interesting side note, I can add that the same con‑
struction appears also in the description of the Battle of the Raudine Plain. The 
Romans fought there against the tribe of Cimbri, who were led by king Boiorix. 
Florus wrote about the successful military tactics of Marius, who used the mete‑
orological conditions15 to surprise his enemies and to delay their reactions: 
Istic quoque imperator addiderat virtuti—dolum secutus Hannibalem ar‑
temque Cannarum; primum nebulosum nanctus diem ut hosti inopinatus oc‑
curreret, tum ventosum quoque, ut pulvis in oculos et ora ferretur, tum acie 
conversa in orientem, ut, quod ex captivis mox cognitum est, ex splendore 
galearum ac repercussu quasi ardere caelum videretur16.
 7 E. G r yksa: Obraz Rzymu u Florusa. Tarnów 2017, pp. 61–62. 
 8 Flor. 1, 1, 15; 1, 13, 14; 1, 22, 26; 1, 24, 6; 1, 34, 14; 1, 41, 14; 2, 6, 8; 2, 10, 2; 2, 12, 1; 1, 13, 
38; 2, 13, 43; 2, 13, 52; 2, 13, 59; 2, 17, 4; 2, 33, 55–56; 2, 33, 59–60.
 9 Flor. 1, 1, 3; 2, 14, 5.
10 Flor. 1, 18, 7; 1, 18, 8; 1, 22, 31; 1, 28, 7; 1, 47, 10; 2, 13, 32; 2, 33, 59.
11 Flor. 2, 15, 2.
12 Flor. 1, 33, 15; 1, 39, 3.
13 Donat. Ad Ter., Eun. 515 = 3, 3, 9.
14 Flor. 1, 1, 4: “For when three had been wounded on one side and two killed on the other, the 
surviving Horatius, adding craft to valour, pretended flight in order to separate his adversaries, and 
attacking them singly, in the order in which they were able to follow him, overcame them” [transl. 
E.S. Foster].
15 Plut. Mar. 26, 4.
16 Flor. 1, 38, 15: “On this occasion too our general had added craft to courage, imitating Han‑
nibal and his stratagem at Cannae. For, in the first place, the day he had chosen was misty, so that he 
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Marius’ army succeeded in establishing supremacy and defeated the Cimbri. It 
is worth stressing that even women fought till the end of the battle17. Furthermore, 
the idea of conscious imitatio Hannibalis18 is important here. Having studied the 
local terrain and weather conditions, he used them against the Romans19 e.g. dur‑
ing the Battle of Cannae:
When Hannibal led out his army at Cannae, where the plain was sandy, he 
placed them with the wind blowing from behind them. The Romans could 
not bear the sand, which was blown into their eyes, and they were routed20 . 
Among the causes of the Roman defeat at Cannae researchers mentioned es‑
pecially the tactical system. The weak point was undoubtedly the heavy infantry21 
(e.g. its distribution)22. 
Another example of using a deceit strategy can be found in the story of the 
conquest of Gabia. This event was also described by Livy, who put the emphasis 
on the fact that deceit and betrayal were not typical Roman methods:
Excepit deinde lentius spe bellum, quo Gabios, propinquam urbem, nequi‑ 
quam vi adortus, cum obsidendi quoque urbem spes pulso a moenibus ademp‑
ta esset, postremo minime arte Romana, fraude ac dolo, adgressus est23.
In his work Livy presents conspicuous views on bravery, deceit and on how 
much worse all things are in his time than they were before. He refers repeatedly 
to religious and secular authorities, rules which should be obeyed24. Despite Livy’s 
opinion about Romans’ attitude towards deceitful and clandestine operations, 
there is no doubt that over the years they were willing to employ varius deception 
could charge the enemy unawares, and it was also windy, so that the dust was driven into the eyes 
and faces of the enemy; finally, he had drawn up his line facing the west, so that, as was afterwards 
learned from the prisoners, the sky seemed to be on fire with the glint reflected from the bronze of 
the Roman helmets” [transl. E.S. Fos te r].
17 Oros. 5, 16, 17–19; Flor. 1, 38, 17; Plut. Mar. 27, 2–3.
18 P. Mat usiak: Obraz Hannibala w literaturze antycznej. Katowice 2015, p. 134. 
19 Polyaen. Strat. 6, 38, 5–6; Front. 3, 2, 7; Front. 2, 5, 25; Plut. Fab. Max. 16.
20 Polyaen. Strat. 6, 38, 4.
21 B.T. Ca rey, J.B. A l l f ree, J. Ca i r ns: Ostatnia bitwa Hannibala. Zama i upadek Kartaginy. 
Przeł. B. Wal igór ska‑ Olejn icza k. Warszawa 2010, p. 99.
22 P. Koz io ł: Hannibal vs. Maharbal – rozważania na temat możliwości marszowych armii 
antycznych. In: Res militaris. Studia nad historią wojen i wojskowości w starożytności. Ed. D. Wa‑
szak. Oświęcim 2013, pp. 107–129.
23 Liv. 1, 53, 4: “He then engaged in an unexpectedly tedious war with Gabii, a neighbouring 
town. After first assaulting the place in vain, he laid siege to it, but this attempt was as unsuccessful 
as the other, for he was driven off from the walls; and he finally resorted to the policy, so unlike 
a Roman, of deceit and trickery” [transl. B.O. Fos te r].
24 Omnibus I: Biblical and Classical civilizations. Ed. D. Wi lson, G.T. Fischer. Lancaster 
2005, p. 220. 
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schemes. In their clever actions the Romans especially used surprise and speed in 
order to gain psychological and military advantage over the enemy, to neutralize 
the opponent’s strength, to conserve resources and to boost the morale and confi‑
dence of the Roman troops on the battlefield25. 
According to the Florus’ history, Tarquin’s son was sent to the Gabines in order 
to win their confidence26. When he had achieved that goal, he sent a messenger 
to his father. Tarquin made no response, he was strolling through his garden and 
knocking off poppy seed heads instead27. This behavior was completely unintel‑
ligible to the messenger as it was a type of a secret language (tacitis ambagibus) 
unknowable to anyone except Tarquin and his son28. On Tarquin’s advice his son 
decided to execute all notable citizens and conquered the Gabii:
Sexto ubi quid vellet parens quidve praeciperet tacitis ambagibus patuit, pri‑
mores civitatis criminando alios apud populum, alios sua ipsos invidia op‑
portunos interemit. Multi palam, quidam in quibus minus speciosa criminatio 
erat futura clam interfecti. Patuit quibusdam volentibus fuga, aut in exsilium 
acti sunt, absentiumque bona iuxta atque interemptorum divisui fuere. Largi‑
tiones inde praedaeque; et dulcedine privati commodi sensus malorum pub‑
licorum adimi, donec orba consilio auxilioque Gabina res regi Romano sine 
ulla dimicatione in manum traditur29.
Tarquin the Superb was the first king expelled from Rome, whose violations 
of constitutional principles precipitated revolution and initiated the creation of the 
25 R.M. Sheldon: Intelligence activities in Ancient Rome. Trust in the gods but verify. London 
2005, pp. 34–35. 
26 P. Lee ‑Stecu m: Mendacia maiorum: Tales of deceit in pre-republican Rome. In: Private 
and public lies. The discourse of despotism and deceit in the Graeco-Roman world. Ed. A.J. Tu r ner,
J.H.K. On Chong‑ Gossa rd, F.J. Ver vaet. Leiden 2010, pp. 251–252: This episode is given vari‑
ous judgements in ancient sources. Valerius Maximus (7, 4, 1) regarded it as praiseworthy shrewd‑
ness in war. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (4, 51, 6) gave it a positive assessment, while Livy character‑
ized Sextus’ stratagem with a strong emphasis on fraus and dolus, which is untypical of the Roman 
nature.
27 Flor. 1, 1, 7.
28 A. Feld her r: “Livy’s revolution: civic identity and the creation of the res publica”. In: The 
Roman cultural revolution. Ed. T. Habi nek, A. Sch iesa ro. Cambridge 1997, p. 146.
29 Liv. 1, 54, 5–6: “As soon as it was clear to Sextus what his father meant and what was the 
purport of his silent hints, he rid himself of the chief men of the state. Some he accused before the 
people; against others he took advantage of the odium they had themselves incurred. Many were 
openly executed; some, whom it would not have looked well to accuse, were put to death in secret. 
Some were permitted, if they chose, to leave the country; or they were driven into banishment, and 
once out of the way, their property was forfeited, just as in the case of those who had been put to 
death. Thence came largesse and spoils, and in the sweetness of private gain men lost their feeling 
for the wrongs of the nation, until, deprived of counsel and aid, the state of Gabii was handed over 
unresisting to the Roman king” [transl. B.O. Fos te r].
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Republic30. The time when the Roman citizens were given the right to assemble in 
order to enact rules and elect the annual officeholders had a strong impact on his‑
tory of the whole world31. In those times Rome was still inhabited by people who 
respected the values of mores maiorum. They were religious, fair‑minded, patient, 
helpful and – most importantly – ready to give their lives for the fellow citizens’ 
safety and for the good of the state. Such an attitude was repeatedly lauded by 
Florus, for whom the Roman virtus was a strong foundation for supremacy over 
the Mediterranean world. Due to respect for traditional values Rome achieved the 
stability after the expulsion of the Tarquins. It did not weaken even during the 
battle with Porsenna, when Horatius Cocles, Cloelia32 and Mucius Scaevola came 
to the fore. Their bravery and strength astounded the Etruscan king, who gave up 
conquering Rome and supporting the Tarquins33. One of the mentioned heroes – 
Mucius Scaevola – also used a trick34 against Porsenna:
Mucius Scaevola regem per insidias in castris ipsius adgreditur, sed ubi frus‑
trato circa purpuratum eius ictu tenetur, ardentibus focis inicit manum ter‑
roremque geminat dolo. “En, ut scias” inquit, “quem virum effugeris; idem 
trecenti iuravimus”; cum interim–inmane dictu–hic interritus, ille trepidaret, 
tamquam manus regis arderet35.
Mucius crossed the Tiber in order to kill Porsenna. When they met he put his right 
hand36 into the fire37. In this way he tried to prove his heroism and virtuous patriot‑
30 O. Joh nson: Rehearing the revolution. Radical Performance, radical politics in the English 
restoration. London 2000, p. 104.
31 F. Mi l la r: The Roman Republic in Political Thought. London 2002, p. 1.
32 M.B. Rol le r: “Exemplarity in Roman culture: The cases of Horatius Cocles and Cloelia”. 
Classical Philology 2004. T. 99, no 1, pp. 1–56.
33 G. For sy the: A critical history of Early Rome: from prehistory to the First Punic War. 
London 2005, p. 149.
34 Polyaen. Strat. 8, 8.
35 Flor. 1, 4, 5–6: “Mucius Scaevola by a stratagem attempted an attack upon the king in his 
own camp, and when he was seized after aiming a blow by mistake at his purple‑clad attendants, 
placed his hand in a blazing fire and by a crafty device doubled the king’s alarm. „Behold,” he said, 
„and know from what sort of a man you have escaped; three hundred of us have sworn to attempt 
the same deed.” Meanwhile, incredible to relate, Mucius was unafraid, but the king was startled as 
though his own hand were burning” [transl. E.S. Fos te r].
36 It is worth mentioning that in Roman culture the right hand was associated with positive 
qualities e.g. agency, rectitude and good fortune, while the left one referred to passivity, deceit, 
dishonor and uncleanliness. The right hand was supposed to be correctly used to perform tasks that 
did not have negative connotations. Right‑handedness also played a significant role in the army as 
being favoured and of preferential status. E. Swift: Roman Artefacts and Society: design, behaviour, 
and experience. Oxford 2017, p. 190. 
37 This behaviour would have underscored his deceit, especially because this was a traditional 
punishment for breaking an oath or pledge. It seems to be an element of traditional Roman heroic 
stories (see also: Val. Max. 3, 3, 2). In Livy the same theme was used not merely to embellish a story 
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ism and persuade the Etruscan king that the young Roman warriors stood ready to 
fight and kill him38, which was also mentioned by Plutarch:
ἔφη δὲ τὸν φόβον τοῦ Πορσίνα νενικηκὼς ἡττᾶσθαι τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ χάριτι 
μηνύειν ἃ πρὸς ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἂν ἐξηγόρευσε. ‘τριακόσιοι γὰρ Ῥωμαίων,’ ἔφη, 
‘τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ γνώμην ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ σου πλανῶνται καιρὸν 
ἐπιτηροῦντες: ἐγὼ δὲ κλήρῳ λαχὼν καὶ προεπιχειρήσας οὐκ ἄχθομαι τῇ τύχῃ, 
διαμαρτὼν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φίλου μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμίου’39.
The tales of Horatius Cocles40, Cloelia41 and Mucius Scaevola became exempla 
of Roman moral values and proved their readiness to sacrifice themselves in order 
to save Rome and its citizens. In Florus’ history we can find numerous examples 
of virtue and moral courage. 
Respecting use of the term dolus it is necessary to add that also Rome’s en‑
emies were also trying to achieve victory by resorting to trickery. Pyrrhus’ strategy 
during the Battle of Beneventum was unsuccessful from the very beginning. He 
wanted to occupy the area located high behind Curius’ camp and suddenly attack 
Roman soldiers. His plan ended in failure, which was described by Plutarch:
περιιόντι δὲ αὐτῷ μακρὰν καὶ δασεῖαν ὕλαις ὁδὸν οὐκ ἀντέσχε τὰ φῶτα, καὶ 
πλάναι τοῖς στρατιώταις συνέτυχον: καὶ περὶ ταῦτα γινομένης διατριβῆς ἥ τε 
but as the centrepiece of his narrative account. Perhaps it could be also interpreted with reference 
to the Augustan regime under which Livy was writing. A companion to Livy. Ed. B. Mineo. Oxford 
2015, p. 199. 
38 C. G rot t anel l i: Kings and Prophets. Monarchic power, inspired leadership, and sacred 
text in Biblical Narrative. Oxford 1999, p. 52.
39 Plut. Publ. 17, 4: “Then he said that although he had conquered the fear which Porsena in‑
spired, he was vanquished by the nobility which he displayed, and would reveal out of gratitude what 
he would not have disclosed under compulsion. «Three hundred Romans, then» said he, «with the 
same resolution as mine, are now prowling about in thy camp and watching their opportunity. I was 
chosen by lot to make the first attempt upon thee, and I am not distressed at what has happened, 
so noble is the man whom I failed to kill, and so worthy to be a friend rather than an enemy of the 
Romans»” [transl. B. Pe r r i n].
40 R. Kauf man: Our Young Folk’s Plutarch. Chapel Hill 2007, p. 89: His agnomen “Cocles” 
was given to him because of the fact that he had only one eye, having lost the other in the wars. 
Together with Herminius and Lartius he defended the wooden bridge over the river Tiber and kept 
the enemy back until his own party cut it down behind him.
41 S.A. Ta kacs: Vestal virgins, Sibils, and Matrons: Women in Roman religion. Texas 2008, 
p. 13: Cloelia was a warrior type, who exhibited strength and skill till the end of the battle. Livy 
defined her as dux agminis virginum (2, 13, 6). Her successful fight infuriated Porsenna, who de‑
manded her return promising to give her back. Then she was given the choice of rescuing a half 
of the Roman hostages, who were in the Etruscan camp. She chose boys under the age of puberty, 
the group especially vulnerable to injury and in that way she demonstrated the importance of civic 
responsibility.
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νὺξ ἐπέλιπε καὶ καταφανὴς ἦν ἅμ᾽  ἡμέρᾳ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐπερχόμενος ἀπὸ 
τῶν ἄκρων, ὥστε θόρυβον πολὺν καὶ κίνησιν παρασχεῖν42.
More details are given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus:
ἔμελλον ὅπερ εἰκὸς οἱ ὁπλῖται κράνεσι καὶ θώραξι καὶ θυρεοῖς βαρεῖς πρὸς 
ὀχθηρὰ χωρία καὶ μακρὰς ἀτραποὺς πορευόμενοι καὶ οὐδὲ ταύτας λεωφόρους, 
ἀλλ᾽  αἰγότριβας δι᾽  ὕλης τε καὶ κρημνῶν τάξιν τε οὐδεμίαν φυλάξειν, καὶ πρὶν 
ἐπιφανῆναί σφισι τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξασθενήσειν τὰ σώματα δίψει καὶ κόπῳ43.
Pyrrhus was conscious of the Roman supremacy and strength so he decided to 
deceive his enemies:
Quippe post primam victoriam intellecta vir callidus virtute Romana statim 
desperavit armis seque ad dolos contulit. Nam interemptos cremavit, cap‑
tivosque indulgenter habuit et sine pretio restituit, missisque legatis in urbem 
omni modo adnixus est, ut facto foedere in amicitiam reciperetur44. 
Pyrrhus’ defeat during the battle was caused by the elephants turning on their 
own line45. A strong blow had frightened one of them. It caused panic among the 
animals which started trampling everything in their path. The defeat of Pyrrhus 
was a turning point in the history of Rome. It was the final act in the conquest of 
Italy and the moment when the Romans began to focus their attention on the wider 
world46. 
The Gauls were described by Florus as people who willingly resorted to deceit 
(Nemo tantum feroces dixerit Gallos: fraudibus agunt47). As the result of an am‑
bush, Aurunculeius Cotta and Titurius Sabinus died:
42 Plut. Pyrrh. 25, 3: “But since he took a long circuit through a densely wooded country, his 
lights did not hold out, and his soldiers lost their way and straggled. This caused delay, so that the 
night passed, and at daybreak he was in full view of the enemy as he advanced upon them from the 
heights, and caused much tumult and agitation among them” [transl. B. Pe r r i n].
43 D.H. Antiquitates Romanae, 20, 11, 1: “It was bound the happen, as might have been ex‑
pected, that hoplites burdened with helmets, breastplates and shields and advancing against hilly 
positions by long trails that were not even used by people but were mere goat‑paths through woods 
and crags, would keep no order and, even before the enemy came in sight, would be weakened in 
body by thirst and fatigue” [transl. E. Ca r y].
44 Flor. 1, 13, 14: “[…] for after his first victory the wily king, recognizing the valour of the 
Romans, immediately gave up hope of military success and had recourse to craft. For he burnt the 
bodies of the slain, treated his prisoners with indulgence and gave them back without ransom, and 
sending ambassadors to Rome strove by every device to obtain a treaty and be admitted to friend‑
ship” [transl. E.S. Fos te r].
45 T. Keight ley: The history of Rome. London 1836, p. 168.
46 The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization. Ed. S. Homblower, A. Spawfor th, 
E. Eid i now. Oxford 2014, p. 674. 
47 Flor. 1, 45, 7.
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Indutiomarus Treveros, Ambiorix concitavit Eburones. Vtrique absente Cae‑
sare coniuratione facta invasere legatos. Sed ille fortiter a Dolabella submo‑
tus est, relatumque regis caput; hic insidis in valle dispositis dolo perculit. 
Itaque et castra direpta sunt et Aurunculeium Cottam cum Titurio Sabino 
legatos amisimus. Nec ulla de rege mox ultio; quippe perpetua trans Rhenum 
fuga latuit48.
In the passages quoted above the next examples of the trickery vocabulary 
are worth bearing in mind. Florus, apart from the noun dolus, used here the terms 
insidiae (ambush) and fraus (trick). The first of these can be found in the Epitome 
de Tito Livio in several other passages49. The ambush at the narrow valley called 
Caudine Forks50, during the military campaign of Veturius and Albinus51 into Sam‑
nium, was set by the Pontius’ army, while Iugurta was trapped by his own father‑
in‑law:
Sic fraudulentissimus regum fraude gener soceri sui in insidias deductus Sul‑
lae in manum traditur, tandemque opertum catenis Iugurtham in triumpho 
populus Romanus adspexit52.
The term fraus in various inflections is often found in Florus’ text53. It is the 
Latin equivalent of the Greek term apate and its roots intertwine with those of 
Greek thrauein (to break) and titroskein (to wound, damage). Its most appropri‑
ate understanding is connected with the ancient idea of fides, in terms of relations 
based on mutual confidence and obligations. 
The Romans attached significance to fides itself, regarding it as honesty and 
reliability – especially in the matter of keeping one’s word. Generally, the cases of 
contravening its rules were few. The Romans boasted about their fides and proudly 
48 Flor. 1, 45, 7–8: “Indutiomarus stirred up the Treveri, Ambiorix the Eburones. In Caesar’s 
absence these two tribes banded together and attacked the lieutenant‑generals. Indutiomarus was 
bravely repulsed by Dolabella, and his head was brought back to the camp. Ambiorix, however, 
defeated us by the stratagem of an ambush set in a valley, with the result that our camp was plun‑
dered and we lost the lieutenant‑generals Aurunculeius Cotta and Titurius Sabinus. No immediate 
vengeance was taken upon the king, who eluded our vigilance by perpetual flight across the Rhine” 
[transl. E.S. Fos te r].
49 Flor. 1, 4, 5; 1, 33, 17.
50 E.L. W heele r: Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery. Leiden 1988, p. 63: Ac‑
cording to the ancient tradition, in 321 B.C., after trapping the Roman army in the Caudine Forks, the 
Samnites were maneuvered out of their success through Roman insults in the peace making process. 
They could justly complain that Roman always gave fraus the semblance of law: Et semper aliquam 
fraudi speciem iuris imponitis (Liv. 9, 11, 7). 
51 Flor. 1, 11, 10.
52 Flor. 1, 36, 17: “Thus the most treacherous of kings was entrapped by the treachery of his own 
father‑in‑law and handed over to Sulla, and at last the Roman people saw Jugurtha led in triumph 
loaded with chains” [transl. E.S. Fos te r].
53 Flor. 1, 1, 7; 1, 11, 7; 1, 22, 13; 1, 33, 6; 1, 33, 7; 2, 10, 9.
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opposed it to that of Graeca and Punica. It was even described by Cicero as funda-
mentum iustitiae (De officiis 1, 7, 23). In the ancient times there were several nor‑
mative acts which were based on fides rules, such as fidepromissio and fideiussio. 
Furthermore, there was an idea of bona fides including the informal pacta adiecta, 
covering such circumstances as dolus or metus. The idea of fides was also crucial 
in international public law. It was invoked in various treaties. Even in the case of 
deditio, when enemies were forced to surrender to victorious Rome, there were 
mutual obligations also based on this concept of loyalty54. 
The range of meanings of fraus goes through “injury” and “damage” to the 
sense of breach of faith – “injury to fides”. In law it can be interpreted on the basis 
of two concepts: “to act for deceit of the law” (in fraudem legis facere) and “to do 
damage to the law” (fraudem legi facere). As a general term for deceit this term 
appears already in Plautus and Terence55. 
The moral intellectual heritage of the tradition known as mos maiorum is 
thought to be a basis on which Rome was strengthened during the period of the 
Empire. This canon of concepts, values and traditional usage lost its significance 
with the decline of collective fear of external enemies56. The latter had compelled 
the Romans to remain united for their safety and salvation for a long time57. It is 
common among researchers to observe that the relation between metus hostilis and 
domestic harmony is of great importance especially for Sallust58. The turning point 
was the destruction of Carthage, which – according to historians’ relations – led to 
inevitable Roman decline59. The solidarity, that had joined people together in order 
to defend the country against a foreign enemy disappeared in 146 B.C. and this 
caused the decline of Roman morality, which took various forms, from corruption 
to fratricidal wars. 
After the collapse of Carthage the Romans turned towards Numidia, the next 
most important kingdom in Africa. When Micipsa died, Jugurtha – a brilliant 
man, who had served under Scipio during the Numantine war – killed his cousins 
(Hiempsal and Adherbal) in order to seize to power60. According to Florus’ history, 
fortune itself gave an opportunity to capture him deceitfully:
Citra spem omnium fortuna cessit, ut rex fraude praecipuus fraude caperetur61.
54 W. Lit ewsk i: Podstawowe wartości prawa rzymskiego. Kraków 2001, pp. 22–23.
55 E.L. W heele r: Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery. Leiden 1988, pp. 63–65.
56 G.B. Conte: Latin Literature: a history. Baltimore 1994, p. 799.
57 D.J. Kapus t: Republicanism, rhetoric and Roman Political Thought: Sallust, Livy, and Taci-
tus. Cambridge 2011, p. 53.
58 I.D. Ev r igen is: Fear of enemies and collective action. Cambridge 2007, p. 41. 
59 R. Ash: “Fission and fusion: shifting Roman identities in the Histories”. In: The Cambridge 
Companion to Tacitus. Ed. A.J. Wood man. Cambridge 2009, p. 96.
60 P.A. Zoch: Ancient Rome: an introductory history. Oclahoma 2012, p. 149.
61 Flor. 1, 36, 2: “Contrary to general expectation, fate decreed that a king preeminent in strata‑
gem should himself be ensnared by a stratagem” [transl. E.S. Fos te r].
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The first crime, like the others, was based on an ambush62. In his policy 
Jugurtha often had recourse to corruption. The introduction of luxury was – in Sal‑
lust’s opinion – a key to the final stage of the Empire’s decline. Avarice and ambi‑
tion were in this case the main vices regarded as the “root of all evil”63 especially 
among the Roman aristocracy:
Bellum scripturus sum, quod populus Romanus cum Iugurtha rege Numi‑
darum gessit, primum quia magnum et atrox variaque victoria fuit, dein quia 
tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est; quae contentio divina et 
humana cuncta permiscuit eoque vecordiae processit, ut studiis civilibus bel‑
lum atque vastitas Italiae finem faceret64.
The war against Jugurtha began in 110 B.C. and resulted in a crushing defeat 
for the Romans. That was the reason why the following year the Senate decided 
to send Quintus Caecilius Metellus to fight. In the face of a foreseeable failure he 
was supported by the commander Gaius Marius, thanks to whom the course if the 
conflict took a positive turn65. He proceeded to attack the cities of Capsa and Molo‑
chath, where he was joined by Lucius Cornelius Sulla66. In the meantime Jugurtha 
was supported by the king Bocchus, whose failure resulted in Jugurtha’s defeat:
Mox non ipsum modo, sed Bocchum quoque Mauretaniae regem, iure san‑
guinis Numidam vindicantem, apud oppidum Cirtam graviter cecidit. Qui ubi 
diffisus rebus suis alienae cladis accessio fieri timet, pretium foederis atque 
amicitiae regem facit. Sic fraudulentissimus regum fraude gener soceri sui 
in insidias deductus Sullae in manum traditur, tandemque opertum catenis 
Iugurtham in triumpho populus Romanus adspexit67.
62 Flor. 1, 36, 3: […] primum scelus mandat insidiis.
63 S. Breu n ige r: Recovering Bishop Berkeley: Virtue and society in the Anglo-Irish context. 
New York 2010, p. 75.
64 Sal. Iug. 5, 1–2: “I am about to relate the war which the Roman people carried on with 
Jugurtha, King of the Numidians; first, because it was great, sanguinary, and of varied fortune; and 
secondly, because then, for the first time, opposition was offered to the power of the nobility; a con‑
test which threw everything, religious and civil, into confusion, and was carried to such a height of 
madness, that nothing but war, and the devastation of Italy, could put an end to civil dissensions” 
[transl. J.S. Wat son].
65 W.E. Heit land: The Roman Republic. Vol. 2, Cambridge 1909, pp. 339–349.
66 W.W. How, H.D. Leigh: A history of Rome to the Death of Caesar. London 1896, p. 369.
67 Flor. 1, 36, 15–17: “Presently he defeated not only Jugurtha himself but also Bocchus, king 
of Mauretania, who from ties of kinship was supporting the Numidians, near the city of Cirta. Boc‑
chus, apprehensive about his own interests and afraid of being involved in another’s ruin, offered the 
person of Jugurtha as the price of a treaty and friendship. Thus the most treacherous of kings was 
entrapped by the treachery of his own father‑in‑law and handed over to Sulla, and at last the Roman 
people saw Jugurtha led in triumph loaded with chains” [transl. E.S. Fos te r].
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Being afraid of a possible defeat Bocchus decided to hand over Jugurtha in 
exchange for his own safety and an alliance with Romans. Jugurtha was ultimately 
entrapped and carried in chains to Rome, where he adorned the triumph of the con‑
queror on 1st January 104 B.C. Later he was starved to death in a foul dungeon, 
which had been carved into the Capitoline rock68. 
In Florus’ history the term consilium (deliberation, plan, purpose) is also worth 
mentioning. It was first used by Cicero as a direct eqiovalent of the Greek term 
strategema. Similarly, Valerius Maximus described four of his examples of Roman 
strategemata with term consilium, while Frontinus listed it as an integral compo‑
nent of strategemata and subsequently used it as a synonym69. 
For the first time with the primary meaning of stratagem, consilium can be 
found in the chapter describing Ventidius’ war against the Parthians. Undoubtedly 
the Roman victory was decided by his deceit:
Nec sine consilio ducis, qui simulato metu adeo passus est hostem castris suc‑
cedere, donec absumpto iactus spatio adimeret usum sagittarum70.
Ventidius successfully overcame both invaders. In 39 B.C., in the Battle of 
Mount Taurus and at the Cilician Gates, he captured and killed Labienus. Later, 
during the Battle of Gindarus in Cyrrhestica he defeated the Arsacid prince Pa‑
corus71. 
However, the peace between the Romans and the Parthians was broken by 
Antonius, who demanded power and honours for himself. His insidiousness was 
described here with the term ars, which can be regarded as the Latin equivalent of 
Greek techne72:
Sed–immensa vanitas hominis–domus titulorum cupidine Araxen et Euphra‑
ten sub imaginibus suis legi concupiscit, neque causa neque consilio ac ne 
imaginaria quidem belli indictione, quasi hoc quoque ex arte ducis esset 
obrepere, relicta repente Syria in Parthos impetum fecit73.
68 W.W. How, H.D. Leigh: A history of Rome to the Death of Caesar. London 1896, p. 371.
69 E.L. W heele r: Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery. Leiden 1988, p. 53.
70 Flor. 2, 19, 6: “The defeat was not inflicted without a stratagem on the part of the general, 
who, under a pretence of panic, allowed the enemy to approach so close to the camp that he prevented 
them from making use of their arrows by depriving them of room to shoot” [transl. E.S. Foster].
71 D.L. Vag i: Coinage and History of the Roman Empire. C. 82 B.C. – A.D. 480: History. 
Chicago 1999, pp. 69–70.
72 E.L. W heele r: Stratagem and the vocabulary of military trickery. Leiden 1988, p. 57.
73 Flor. 2, 20, 2: “But such was the exceeding vanity of the man that, in his desire for fresh titles 
of honour, he longed to have the Araxes and Euphrates inscribed beneath his statues, and, without 
any pretext or design and without even a pretended declaration of war, just as if it were part of the 
art of generalship to attack by stealth, he left Syria and made a sudden attack upon the Parthians” 
[transl. E.S. Fos te r].
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In 36 B.C. Antonius decided to conduct a military expedition against Phraates 
IV through Armenia. He was forced to retreat because of considerable casualties, 
caused both by the enemies’ treacherous attacks74 and arduous conditions:
Infesta primum siti regio, tum quibusdam salmacidae [fluvius] infestiores, 
novissime quae iam ab invalidis et audite hauriebantur noxiae etiam dulces 
fuere. Mox et ardores per Armeniam et nives per Cappadociam et utriusque 
caeli subita mutatio pro pestilentia fuit75.
Only in 34 B.C. was Antony able to reorganize his army and restore the Roman 
power. However, his plan of Parthia conquer was restricted to defeating the Arme‑
nia only. His later military actions were unsuccesfull because of the deterioration 
in relation between Anthony and Octavianus76. 
All the examples of trickery vocabulary analyzed in this article, such as dolus, 
fraus, ars and consilium testify to Florus’ skill as a writer. Florus – as an objective 
writer – did not avoid difficult and controversial topics in witting his work, but 
thanks to the variety of language forms and terms he presents he can easily focus 
his readers’ attention and let them know the arcana of ancient history, tradition and 
culture. 
74 Flor. 2, 20, 3.
75 Flor. 2, 20, 8–9: “In the first place the lack of water in the district was fatal, but still more 
fatal to some was the brackish water which they drank; and, finally, even fresh water was harmful 
when drunk with avidity by the soldiers in their already debilitated condition. Afterwards the heat 
in Armenia and the snows of Cappadocia and the sudden change from one climate to another were 
as destructive as a plague”. [transl. E.S. Fos te r].
76 M. Jacz y nowska, M. Pawlak: Starożytny Rzym. Warszawa 2008, p. 158.
